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NATURAL LAW WITHOUT METAPHYSICS?:
THE CASE OF JOHN FINNIS
JEREMY SHEARMUR*

John Finnis's Natural Law and Natural Rights' is a remarkable book.

Finnis offers a robust exposition and defence of natural law-but in terms
that differ significantly from the way in which this tradition is often
understood today, not least by its defenders. He does so by means of
striking and powerful arguments; arguments that owe little, however, to
the major philosophical traditions of this century. It is as if a new species
2
of C.S. Lewis's "Old Western man" had appeared on the scene. Finnis
moved
has
interprets an old tradition in radically new ways. Moreover, he
attack
the
go
onto
to
tradition
that
of
from a restatement and defence
against contemporary work in ethical theory 3 and, most recently, has
applied his ideas to the important issue of the morality of nuclear deterrence. 4 In the paper that Finnis contributes to the present symposium,
he presents interesting arguments against Ronald Dworkin, a writer
whose views in legal philosophy might superficially seem close to his own.
In particular, Finnis criticizes Dworkin's ideas about the determinate
character of the law, using arguments drawn from his own interpretation
of the natural law tradition.
It is clearly not possible, in one short paper, for me to do justice to the
views of a writer whose work is as controversial as it is rich, and so I
must be selective.
1. Finnis and the Problematic of Natural Law
For those outside the tradition of natural law, the problematic of natural law in our own century would typically be understood as it is pre5
sented in the work of a figure such as Henry Veatch. Natural law, in his
view, is grounded on a view of the world in which different species have
essences and natural ends; ends which are to be chosen in the case of
mankind, who possess free will. Such natural ends and essences distin-

* Jeremy Shearmur, B.Sc.(Econ), M.Sc., Ph.D. (London School of Economics,
University of London); Research Associate Professor, Institute for Humane Studies at George Mason University, 4400 University Drive, Fairfax, VA 22030.
I would like to thank my colleague Emilio Pacheco for useful discussion on

the subject of this paper, which we had, initially, hoped to write jointly, and
Bradford Hooker, Michael Krauss, and especially David Gordon for criticism and
suggestions. I would, however, emphasize that they are not to blame in any way
for such errors and confusions as remain.
I J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980) [hereinafter NATURAL
LAW].
2

C.S. LEWIS, De Descriptione Temporum in SELECTED LITERARY ESSAYS (W.

Hooper ed. 1969).
3 J. FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS (1983) [hereinafter FUNDMENTALS].

4 J. FINNIS, J. BOYLE & G. GRISEZ, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, MORALITY AND REALISM (1987).
SCf. H. VEATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS: FACT OR FANCY? (1985).
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guish different species and different kinds of things. With the exception
of man if he makes incorrect choices, such essences must be understood
if we are to be able to understand the way in which the world works:
they play an explanatory role. On this view, we can in principle come to
understand the content of natural law by means of empirical investigation
of a certain kind. But corresponding to this external investigation there
must also be, in the case of man, an "internal" investigation. The kind
of conduct that can be discovered "externally" to represent the fullest
development of human nature will also, when considered "internally",
turn out to represent his moral completion. But-and this, presumably,
is the point of natural law theory in such an interpretation-the connection between the essence of man and how we understand the world is
required so that we may be assured that there is more to morality than
that which we find subjectively appealing. It may also serve a role in
helping us to decide between objects of moral choice about which we are,
intuitively, indifferent.
The problematic of this tradition, however, stems in part from the
relation between the internal and the external accounts. What is the
relation between our explanatory understanding and what is important
morally? What, in the case of man, is to play the required explanatory
role, and can whatever plays such a role plausibly play the required moral
role, too?6 Above all-as Leo Strauss argued in the Introduction to his
NaturalRight and History7 - it seems unclear what is supposed to happen

to this tradition once, after the work of Galileo, Descartes, Newton (and
also Darwin), the natural sciences abandoned teleology. While it is still
possible for philosophers to defend scientific realism, it is not clear, even
if this could be done successfully,8 that such a defence would have any
relevance to issues of morality. And while those who believe in God might
still think that He has imposed some kind of order onto the world, it is
not clear that there is any obvious connection between such an order and
the moral duties of man.'
Finnis, in Natural Law and Natural Right, sidesteps these problems

by taking a largely internalist view of natural law. (In this respect there

6See, e.g., the summary of such criticisms of natural law theories offered by
J. GRAY,
LIBERALISM (1986).
7
L. STRAuss, Introduction in NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 8 (1953).
'Compare B. VAN FRASSEN, THE SCIENTIFIC IMAGE (1980) and my Realism
Under Attack?, 16 PHIL. OF THE Soc. Sci. 219-22 (1986).
9 To

be sure, some-such as those who delivered the Boyle Lectures (compare,

A DEFENCE OF NATURAL AND REVEALED RELIGION: BEING AN ABRIDGEMENT OF
THE SERMONS PREACHED AT THE LECTURE FOUNDED BY THE HONOURABLE ROBERT

BOYLE, ESQ.,

(G. Burnet ed. 1737))-tried to read moral and political lessons out

of Newton, and there was a continuing tradition of natural theology. But it would
seem to me that once one leaves teleology behind, the content of those lessons is
very much up for grabs. (Compare the work of J.R. and M.C. Jacob, for example,

as cited in the bibliography in Shapin, History of Science and its Sociological
Reconstructions, 20 HIST. OF SCI. 157-211 (1982). I do not necessarily endorse the
sociological reading of this material offered in the Jacobs' work.)
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might seem to be common ground with Dworkin.) Rather than trying,
with Veatch, to defend an older cosmology or to engage with problems of
supposed connections between fact and value, Finnis instead offers us
what might be called a descriptive phenomenology of moral action (in an
ordinary rather than a technical, Husserlian sense). From reflection upon
this, he reads off various features which he claims to be undeniable moral
truths. Finnis's approach-which he also defends as true to the great
figures in the natural law tradition -is powerful, because it enables him
to avoid problems that writers such as Veatch have found so difficult. 10
It also offers him the means of fending off other challenges to natural
law theory.
First, for Finnis there is no problem of moving from facts to values,
because within his starting-point-the "internal" reflective analysis of
action-values are already there to be found. (What is more, Finnis tells
us a lot concerning those values, steering a course between those who
maintain that anything could be valuable in the sense that it could represent a possible object of human choice, and those for whom there is no
moral choice, because in one way or another all moral choices are fully
determinate.) Second, Finnis suggests that what is today often cited as
"the" statement of a fact/value problem, Hume's analysis, is in fact better
understood as directed towards a different problem: one of the relation
between truth and motivation. Here Finnis also offers a solution, suggesting that "one is motivated according to one's understandingof the
goodness and desirability of [certain] human opportunities". 1 In respect
to both of these moves, Finnis seems to be essentially correct and also at
one with some modern12 defenders of "moral realism" who lie outside the
natural law tradition.
From all this, however, there emerge two issues which I will pursue in
a little more depth: Finnis's specific account of an internalist realism (on
which I must be extremely cursory); and some problems of internalist
realism itself (and of Finnis's use of the cosmological argument). I will
conclude by taking up a point that Finnis develops in his paper in this
collection. I will, broadly, endorse his argument against Dworkin and
agree that judicial decisions are not fully determinate. I will suggest,
however, that this opens up an important practical issue in public policy;
one which may demand a radical solution.

10Veatch, for example, might seem able to score important points for a teleological cosmos by offering a Quinean account of science, such that it has no simple
metaphysical import, and thus cannot play in truth the role that it played his-

torically of undermining an Aristotelian cosmology. However, what is good for

science-a sophisticated conventionalism-would also seem good for metaphysics.
It is not clear, once Veatch has used Quine's arguments against the scientific
realist, how he can avoid their use against his own realist, Aristotelian metaphysics.
SNATURAL LAW, supra note 1, at 47.
12Compare, for example, the excellent survey of some of the issues involved
in D. McNAUGHTON, MORAL VISION (1987).
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2. Finnis as Philosopher
From what I have written above, the reader will understand that I
appreciate the boldness of Finnis's ideas. I also think that in many important respects he is completely correct, and that where he is not right,
he is challenging and interesting. However, while Finnis's points are
boldly and strikingly put, they are often delivered in a "take-it-or-leaveit" manner, with little or no argument or anticipation of possible objections. Insofar as Finnis is giving us a descriptive account grounded in
the phenomenology of his own moral world, I suppose that we must take
his word for it. But insofar as his points are intended to be inter-subjectively acceptable, his method often falls short of what is required. In
particular, he does not seem to consider whether our moral experience
may be subject to different and competing interpretations, each of which
may in itself be more or less coherent, but over the merits and adequacy
of which argument may be possible: that the situation in ethics may thus
closely parallel that in science or in other areas of knowledge. Instead,
Finnis's approach seems to me largely descriptive. Where he offers arguments, they seem to involve the suggestion that anyone who espouses
a view other than his own must hold a position that is in some way selfdefeating.
Take, for example, what he says about knowledge. Finnis tells us that
knowledge is valuable in itself. But there is no attempt to meet arguments
that might be offered by someone who challenges that proposition-for
instance, by holding that knowledge is valuable only relative to human
needs and concerns. 13 Indeed, let us for a moment consider how someone
who holds such a view might argue against Finnis's view. He might
advance the claim that it is not clear that the world is a better place for
someone's knowing how many letters there are in the full edition of the
Oxford English Dictionary.The point of such an objection might be to
suggest that it is not the case that knowledge is valuable in itself, but
instead to affirm that it is valuable only in relation to certain human
needs or concerns.
Now Finnis might reply that he has himself written that to "think of
knowledge as a value is not to think that every true proposition is equally
worth knowing".14 True enough. But what Finnis has not done is to offer
an argument that all knowledge is of some value. Instead, Finnis offers
the argument that the skeptic who claims "that knowledge is not a good"
is operationally self-refuting. 15 But it is not clear that someone who denies
13 1 should perhaps stress here that my concern is not so much with the skeptic
as with those who hold different substantive views from those of Finnis-from

the pragmatists to a writer like Nicholas Maxwell who argues passionately that
human knowledge is misunderstood in theory and perverted in practice unless
we bear in mind its relation to human needs, including those for wisdom and
intelligibility. See N.
14

NATURAL LAW,

MAXWELL, WHATS WRONG WITH SCIENCE?

supra note 1, at 62.

(1976).

15Id. at 68.
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that knowledge is a good per se must embrace the views which Finnis
criticizes. Rather, he may take the view that much knowledge-including
his own claim -is valuable, but maintain that how we should understand
its value is at bottom as instrumental rather than as intrinsic. It is simply
not the case that we are faced here-or elsewhere-with a choice between
Finnis's views and views that are self-refuting.
It is striking that Finnis often seems to treat all theorists who hold
views different from his own as people who are either denying the obvious
or who fall prey to various fallacies. It is almost as if Finnis thought that
his views (rather than simply being some-in his judgement, the bestamong the various different, contending theories) are the only views that
a reasonable person could hold. To this we will return.
Finnis also lays down a number of "principles of sound empirical judgement". He offers us a list of such principles and gives a brief account of
his view of their status. But he does not discuss possible objections to his
principles or alternative views as to their status. This is all the more
striking as one of his principles would seem to be false in the form in
which he states it. Finnis tells us that "an account or explanation of
phenomena is not to be accepted if it requires or postulates something
inconsistent with the data for which it is supposed to account."' 16 But it
has been argued that this is precisely what occurred when Newton explained-and corrected-Kepler's laws. 17 (As we shall see, this kind of
"fact-correcting" explanation is of some significance in relation to Finnis's
views about the epistemology of ethical claims.)
My point here is not to make a big fuss over the fact that one of Finnis's
formulations may be incorrect. After all, this is the common fate of philosophers who try to say anything that is of interest. My concern, rather,
is that there is an unfortunate tendency in Finnis's work to present his
ideas as if he were reading them off the very fabric of the universe, rather
than as something that emerges from, and has to be redeemed in, argument with his colleagues.
Things are much the same in Finnis's substantive account of ethics.
While his presentation is refreshingly direct, he writes as if he had no
idea of what others would find problematic about his views. For example,
Finnis's account of things that are of value and of practical reasonableness
veers from sometimes reading as if it were an account of the ground upon
which all serious moral battles are to be fought out (i.e. that most moral
problems would involve debates about the merits of choices between the
things that he describes) to suddenly being the vehicle for specific, contentious but unargued judgements about highly controversial matters
such as abortion and the moral status of animals. In addition, as a conscientious non-believer, I was surprised to discover a section of my moral
concerns being kidnapped by Finnis, with virtually no argument, for the
category of religion!
1Id.at 74.
17

See P.

DUHEM, THE AIM AND STRUCTURE OF PHYSICAL THEORY, (P.
POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE ch. 5 (1972).

trans. 1945) and K.
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In his more detailed discussion, Finnis has important, interesting, and
in my view, wise things to say about some aspects of human moral experience. But he seems not to recognize the full variety or the complexity
and moral ambiguity of many of the objects of human moral experience
and endeavor. Consider what some people reportedly experience when
hunting game for pleasure or when exercising power; or the close links
that some people experience existing between ecstasy and pain. Consider
also the streak of fanaticism-and what one might call practical unreasonableness-that frequently seems to be a vital ingredient in many of
the most important of human achievements.
I was also struck by the way in which, if one were to go by Finnis's
account, one would have no conception of the very existence of people
such as the "Walter" of My Secret Life. 8 This author published, in his
old age, what apparently we must take as a reflective account of a life
given over to the all-consuming pursuit of sexual experience. While he
had, to be sure, some qualms about how he had treated some people, and
more than a usual degree of blindness about how his actions would have
appeared in the eye of an impartial spectator, he seemed, nonetheless,
able on reflection to take a positive view of his life. While the subject of
his concerns, and the rigidity of his pursuit of them, are doubtless exceptional, many of us might be able to tell a similar story of our concern
with philosophy, cats, cricket, music, or whatever. These stories, unlike
those of people of exceptional achievement, will not be redeemed by our
having achieved anything that anyone else will judge significant. But for
those of us who are not religious believers, one of the endearing and truly
human features of our species is our ability to care passionately about
things that, in the end, are transient, just as are we.
All this is not to deny that Finnis might turn out to be right (although
in my view our appreciation of human life would be diminished if he
were). It is, rather, to express concern about the narrowness of Finnis's
vision, and about his prima facie lack of concern about engaging with the
arguments that he must realize would be brought against his ideas.
The features of Finnis's approach singled out in this section for critical
attention are not, in my judgement, merely matters of his personal style.
Rather, I believe them to be a consequence of his implicit epistemology
of ethics. He takes our mature reflection upon experience as a source of
moral knowledge in something akin to the understanding of the sources
of knowledge held by empiricists and intellectualists in early modern
18 Cf. "WALTER", MY SECRET LIFE, (G. Grimley ed. 1972). He does, it is true, in
his Second Preface refer to the way in which, in looking back on material that
he wrote as a younger man, he is struck by the "monotony" of "the course he had
pursued towards women." But might not a teacher, a salesman or a solicitor
experience the same reaction on perusing journals kept, in some detail, about
their earlier years?
If, as David Gordon has suggested to me, the appropriate response is "But
'Walter' was merely pursuing one of Finnis's values," this simply highlights the
problem raised earlier in my text that these values may be the ground upon which
moral battles are fought, as opposed to offering any substantial guidance on which
choices are appropriate for people to make.
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philosophy. 19 This, I suspect, generates the "Moses striding down the
mountain with the tablets of law"-like aspects of his philosophical style.
In addition, this speculation explains why he treats those who disagree
with him as either falling prey to fallacies or denying the obvious: for if,
at a certain level, he takes his own views as self-evidently correct, what
else can he say? If I am correct about all this, it points to a significant
weakness in his views-and to something that is in no way a necessary
feature of an internalist approach to ethics such as the one he takes.
Finnis stands in need of an account of how disputes at the internal or
practical level are to be resolved. But he also needs to appreciate that
disputes can arise concerning the character of what we are discerning by
such means-a point that I explore below.
One final point. It seems to me that we should be very careful about
the status that we grant to our moral experience. How we experience the
world, and our reflective understanding of that experience, may be affected not only by our substantive moral theories, but also by social
conventions and various patterns of domination which we may well not
recognize as such. People's moral experience of slavery, or of relations of
class or status, or of the relations between men and women, are not
something that can be uncritically used as data for the construction of
ethical theory. It may only be in the light of theoretical reflection that
we discern the ethical undesirability of things which we had hitherto
taken simply as part of the furniture of our moral universe.
3. The Limits of Internalism
Let me turn, now, to what is perhaps the heart of Finnis's approach:
his internalism (by which I mean his insistence on ethics as a practical
rather than a theoretical discipline). 20 For whether or not my objections
to his elaboration of his theory are correct, his internalism has considerable attractions and merits very serious consideration. Of this internalism, however, we must ask: does a purely internalist natural law
theory work? Can it stand without those links to metaphysics and an
understanding of the world that were so much a feature of those approaches to natural law of which Finnis is critical?
Insofar as Finnis is an internalist (we must also bear in mind the final
sections of his NaturalLaw and NaturalRight and of his Fundamentals
of Ethics, to which we will turn, later), he is, in fact, in broad agreement

9 Compare, K. POPPER, On the Sources of Knowledge
CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENCE,

and of Ignorance, in
(1965).
Or, rather, what should be called his primafacie internalism; for as we shall
see, at the heart of Finnis's views is in fact his version of the cosmological argument. In the end, rather than an internalism that rescues ethics from dependence on metaphysics, the whole structure rests upon metaphysics of the most
traditional sort. He does not, as far as I can tell, explain how this relates to his
emphasis, as opposed to Veatch and Adler, on a practical rather than a theoretical
or metaphysical interpretation of natural law theory.
20
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with Dworkin, the object of his criticism in the paper that Finnis has
contributed to the present volume. Dworkin also takes an internalist view
of ethics, arguing that there is no need for the proponent of such a view
21
to answer what he calls "external skepticism".
I wish to argue that internalism is not enough, and that for a natural
law theory or a theory of ethics to be successful it must also be prepared
to address "external" questions: ethics cannot avoid being a theoretical
discipline. Finnis might well be incredulous at such a statement. Given
his account of the phenomenology of moral life; given his ability to answer,
in terms of his internalism, the kind of problems that led Veatch into
externalism and its difficulties; and given his use of Wiggins 22 to answer
Mackie's 23 worries about the "queerness" of objective values, he might
wonder whether I am not beckoning him off the path of internalism in
the hope that he will lose himself in the swamp of objectivist natural law
theory. What possible reason could there be for him to take up the problematic of this tradition given his success at resolving the questions that
he has addressed and the singular lack of success of those who have
followed that other path?
My argument is that Finnis's appeals to the phenomena of our moral
experience are insufficient to make his case. There may be more than one
explanatory account that could be offered of the character of moral experience; there could, as it were, be more than one way in which the
appearances could be saved. But certain such accounts, if accepted as
correct, would lead us to take a different view of those things that present
themselves to us as the demands of morality; we might judge their real
character to be other than how these things present themselves to us. I
will offer three examples to illustrate my point.
First, to argue successfully for the objectivity of some effect does not
show that we are correct in our understanding of its character. For example, those who point to the occurrence of certain kinds of mystical
experience in various different religious traditions certainly produce evidence that tells for the objectivity of the existence of these experiences.
What such evidence does not do, of itself, is to show that these experiences
are genuinely to be understood as religiousin their character. This would
be a matter for further argument. (And indeed, the occurrence of what
seem to be similar experiences in different religious traditions might be
at odds with what certain of these traditions had claimed about the religious character of those experiences.)
Second, Finnis makes much, against Mackie, of the Platonic theme of
our desiring things because they seem good to us, rather than their seeming good to us because we desire them. 24 Suppose that Finnis were correct
1 See R. DWORKIN, LAWS EMPIRE 78 (1986).
22 Cf., FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 3, at 63-67

(referring to Wiggins, Truth,
Invention and the Meaning of Life, in ESSAYS ON MORAL REALISM (G. Sayre-McCord
ed. 1988)).
'
Compare, J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 38 (1977) and
FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 3, at 57.
FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 3, at 44.
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concerning the phenomenology of these areas of our experience. This
would not, on the face of it, prevent Mackie, or others in the Hobbesian
tradition, from claiming that these things seem good to us simply in virtue
of the nature that we happen to have. Consider, here, the character of
25
Screwtape, as revealed at the end of C.S. Lewis's The Screwtape Letters.
What had seemed, earlier in the story, to be the expressions of an avuncular affection are revealed as expressions of an obscene predatory lust
by the older devil for the very being of his junior. Now imagine, further,
that Screwtape had given us a more extended description of what there
was to be appreciated about his junior, from such a perspective. One
could-or so it would seem to me -give a Platonic account of the character
of these qualities. But we would hardly be willing to judge that his account
was an account of what was really good, despite the fact that it presented
itself that way to him. (We might, say, take much the same view of the
pederast's appreciation of a small child or a cannibal's appreciation of
ourselves.) The point of this example, however, is to suggest that the kind
of reality that we may get from a "Platonic" account of moral phenomenology, where this is understood as the product of our nature, is not
necessarily something that we would wish to treat at face value.
The idea of the relativity of the moral to our nature may pose a third
problem. When we offer a practical account of our moral experience, are
we in fact concerned with an experience of the moral at all?
Consider the kind of account of human morality that is suggested by
Richard Dawkins' The Selfish Gene.26 Dawkins' intriguing idea is that
we might see ourselves as, in effect, instruments that our genes use to
perpetuate and multiply themselves. Our moral impulses and reactions,
on such a view, are real enough; but the way in which their objects present
themselves to us leads us to misunderstand their character. Rather than
the categorical character that they may appear to possess, they are actually to be understood as hypothetical in their force, and with an antecedent that, should we understand it for what it is, we may well reject.
Rather than imperatives that are intrinsically binding, and a panoply of
goods that are intrinsically worthwhile and often to be preferred to our
narrower self-interest, their true character, on such an account, is very
different. Many aspects of morality turn out to be a set of responses that
are (broadly) effective at their task of getting us to propagate, and then
care for, the genes of which we, and those close to us, were until recently
the unknowing carriers.
Such a theory is suggestive. It would offer us an account not only of
the existence of "morality" and of our moral phenomenology as the product
of such a "nature", but it would also offer some suggestive ideas about
why human moral phenomenology takes some of the forms that it does.
(For example, it explains why we should care so much more about people
close to us than we do about other human beings-for those close, other
things being equal, stand a better chance of carrying genes that are
similar to ours.)
21
26

See, C.S. LEwIs, THE SCREWTAPE LETTERS 156 (1969).
R. DAwKnis, THE SELFISH GENE (1978).
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I should perhaps say a little more about this account, 27 as there are
different ways in which it might be understood. It might be interpreted
as offering a naturalistic explanation of how we come to have the moral
experience that Finnis describes. But such an account, it might be argued,
does not invalidate the character of that experience as moral. Rather, it
simply exhibits the mechanisms by means of which we have such experiences. I do not, personally, think that there can be a compatibility
between a fully naturalistic explanation and something's having coherent, non-naturalistic properties. 28 My argument against Finnis, however,
does not rest upon this particular piece of unargued metaphysics. The
Dawkins-inspired story that I have sketched above does not merely offer
a naturalistic explanation of the existence of the phenomena with which
Finnis is concerned; it gives a particular such account which calls Finnis's
treatment of these phenomena into question.
There are at least two ways in which such a story might be understood
to challenge Finnis's views. The first of these assumes Dawkins offers a
competing explanation of the moral phenomenology offered by Finnis.
The central idea here is that there can be more than one theory that is
equally compatible with the same evidence. The evidence, in this case
the moral phenomenology, does not in itself enable us to decide between
them (although other evidence or arguments may tell in favor of one
rather than the other theory). Consequently one cannot read the truth
of one particular theory off from evidence that is compatible with it. But,
it might be objected, how could our Dawkins-like account undermine
Finnis's theory, given that Finnis spells out the way in which we naturally
understand the experience in question?
To this one can respond that the situation may be similar to Richard
Gregory's account, in his Eye and Brain,2 of experiments that led people
to experience that they were looking at a chair when, in fact, they were
looking at cleverly arranged pieces of wood. The wood was arranged such
that it generated the same perceptual experiences as would a chair, seen
from a particular perspective. And we are naturally disposed to interpret
such experiences as perceptions of chairs rather than of groupings of
disconnected pieces of wood. On a Dawkins-like account of the activities
of our genes, they would have led us to experience something that presents
itself to us as the moral, when, in fact, what we are experiencing is an
"aura" that has been given to it so as to enhance behavior that promotes
their survival. Just as- in Gregory's case-the disclosure of the particular
mechanism that led us to have the experiences in question is incompatible
with our continuing to interpret this experience of seeing a chair as, in
fact, having been produced by a chair so the disclosure of a Dawkinsian
mechanism as standing behind our moral experience would lead us to

271 would

like to thank David Gordon for insisting that this was necessary.

u Cf., K.R.

POPPER &

J.C.

ECCLES, THE SELF AND ITS BRAIN

(1978) (consider

Karl Popper's contributions for an indication of the lines upon which I would
argue this).
R. GREGORY, EYE AND BRAIN (1966).
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question whether we should take our experience of the moral quite as it
presents itself to us. Thus, Dawkins is here understood as suggesting an
explanation of the genesis of our moral phenomenology which is incompatible with our continuing to take it at its face value.
One further point should perhaps be added. It might seem that such
an account requires, in each case, that there be a genuine something there
(a chair; morality) which is then imitated. I do not see why this has to
be the case in the particular circumstances which we are considering.
For there seems to me no reason why an entire way of experiencing things
may not be manufactured. For our genes, in the kind of view that we are
discussing, are not like parasites that opportunistically take advantage
of an existing pattern in our behavior in order to exploit it for their own
purposes-as does a cuckoo the behavior of some other bird. Rather, we
are their creation.
The other way of interpreting Dawkins' account as challenging Finnis's
views would be to see him as having offered us a "fact-correcting" explanation. That is to say, what his theory would here offer is not-as in our
previous interpretation -something that completely replicates our moral
phenomenology but, rather, something that explains it and, at the same
time, corrects it. If it were to do this, it would lead us to discern features
of our moral phenomenology that differed slightly from the character that
we had imputed to it up to this point. We would, as it were, be left with
a better picture of our "moral" experience, and a new explanation of its
character which fitted our new account, but which was not completely
compatible with the account that we had accepted up to that point.
Our new account, however, would have to represent a good approximation to our older account, which was being corrected, so that we could
understand how we had earlier accepted our previous view of what was
going on. (A Dawkins-like reinterpretation of the moral would fit this
particularly well, just because we are, on that account, disposed to interpret this experience in just the kind of way that Finnis describes.)
Such ideas about the correction of what we had previously taken as
statements of plain matters of observable fact are not as far-fetched as
they might seem: there is ample documentation of the way in which our
theoretical interpretation of phenomena shapes the way in which we
experience them. It is often only when our previous theories are challenged that we are led to a new, more accurate descriptive account of
what we were observing.3o
Should we come to accept a theory such as Dawkins' as correct, we
might well come to treat moral constraints upon our behavior rather
differently than we do now. Our moral phenomenology might well stay
pretty much the same (just as, say, we may well continue to experience
visual illusions as illusions, even when we understand that they are
illusory). But we may not accord it the same weight when moral consid30

Compare, E.H. GOMBRICH, ART AND ILLUSION ch. 11 (1960) and P.K. FEYERABEND, Problems of Empiricism in BEYOND THE EDGE OF CERTAINTY: ESSAYS IN
CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 145-260 (R. Colodny ed. 1965).
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erations clash with our individual interests, or with other things that we
care about, as we did in the past. While we may still, on reflection, prefer
the higher pleasures to the lower-on eudaemonistic grounds-it is not
clear that we would have reason to defer to what presented itself as moral
when it was clearly against our wider personal interests to do so.
I am not suggesting that a theory such as Dawkins' is true; only that
if it were, it would call Finnis's account of natural law into question.
Furthermore, in order to answer such an argument, it would be necessary
for Finnis-and Dworkin-to emerge from their internalism and engage
in metaphysical and scientific argument.
This might, on the face of it, seem no major issue. As someone sympathetic to moral realism, I face precisely the same problem. It seems to
me, however, that to make this move into science and metaphysics is of
no small significance for Finnis'sviews, given the way in which-contrary
to the views of Veatch and of Adler-he has placed emphasis on natural
law as being practical rather than theoretical in its character. 31 My argument is that, while the challenge posed by a view like that of Dawkins
may be one that Finnis is able to meet-perhaps with ease-the argument
that he must use in so doing cannot be purely practical in its character.
I am here using Dawkins to put an older point in a modern form. The
critical reader perusing the work of Bishop Butler might have been led
to ask: Is the voice of conscience the voice of God? And the reader of Adam
Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments32 might wonder if there is more to
human conscience than a tidied-up version of the judgements of various
"significant others" - something which on the face of it need have no moral
significance at all. The links for which Veatch and others were seeking
were surely something that, if they could be found, would provide a measure of reassurance that what presents itself to us as morally binding
should, indeed, be taken as such.
However, the reader who recalls the final section of either NaturalLaw
and Natural Rights, or Fundamentals of Ethics will know that Finnis
does in fact discuss metaphysics; indeed, metaphysics of a most traditional
kind. For it turns out that he wishes to go, with St. Augustine, beyond
the internalist "athleticism" of the Stoics. In order to do this, he offers
us a version of the cosmological argument. But this move is less than
adequate, for two reasons.
First, the cosmological argument cuts no ice other than with those who
are already committed to certain kinds of metaphysical theory. While
there may be something interesting that can be said to those outside this
tradition on the question why there is something rather than nothing, 3
it hardly seems a question to which someone must think that there has
to be an answer at all (for example, if they hold a theory that explanation
is inescapably relative because it always consists of explaining one thing

"Cf., FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 3, ch. 1.
"A. SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (1759).
"Cf., R. NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS, ch. 2 (1981).
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in terms of something else). If someone could already make anything of
the idea of something's being necessary in itself (as opposed to necessary
relative to something else), they might find the cosmological argument
attractive. But it seems to me that such metaphysics are, to say the least,
less than compelling. However, as Finnis indicates that his views here
34
rest upon those of another writer, and we have already strayed far from
ideas in which the reader of this Review is likely to be interested, I will
not engage further in this argument here.
The second reason, however, is of more immediate concern. In my view,
there is a mismatch between what would be needed to meet an external
challenge of the kind that I have described, and the kind of argument
that Finnis offers, should that be presented as such. For what is needed,
I have suggested, is an argument that tells us that moral experience is
genuinely moral. But Finnis's argument is too general for this. On the
face of it, the bare existence of a First Cause is compatible with a Dawkinsstyle account of morality, while the links that Finnis offers between his
metaphysical argument and anything that pertains to morality are extremely tenuous. To firm up those links, and to make the connections to
issues of morality that would meet the threat posed by my interpretation
of the significance of Dawkins' argument, would seem to lead Finnis back
to just the kind of exercise in theoretical metaphysics from which he has
taken such pains to dissociate himself.
4. The Consequences of Indeterminacy
So much for the more grandly philosophical aspects of Finnis's approach. But what of the specific concerns of the paper that he offers in
the present volume?
Here, I am broadly sympathetic to his argument, against Dworkin, that
precedent and moral principle cannot fully determine legal decisions.
However, if Finnis is correct about this, he opens up an important problem. For if there is an indeterminacy in legal decision-making of this
kind, we may well ask: on what basis will decisions, then, be made? If
Finnis's argument is correct, has he not shown where interest may enter
into legal decision-making? And if this is the case, do we not face problems
theorists, 35
like those to which we have been alerted by public choice
especially when legal decisions are enforced with the power of the state?
If there is anything in all this, we may face a genuine problem of whether
the decisions of the courts will in fact be in the interest of their clients
See NATURAL LAW, supra note 1, at 382.
By this I mean problems of the kind that have been raised in the work of
James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and other members of the Virginia School of
political economy. I should perhaps explain that my concern here is with their
point that we cannot presume that government-or indeed judges-act in the
public interest, like a benevolent despot. I do not wish to claim that those making
such decisions are necessarily self-interested or that they are motivated by a
desire for pecuniary gain.
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1990

13

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:123

and more broadly in the general interest. (The problem seems to be acute
precisely because decisions can be called to account only to the extent
that they are determinate on the basis of principle and precedent.)
What we might do in the face of such problems, if they are real, would
take me beyond the scope of the present paper. But it is perhaps worth
considering whether, in the face of these concerns, we should look again
at the radical idea of competing legal jurisdictions, initial compliance
with which is a matter of voluntary agreement, as a mechanism that
could keep a check upon the courts' ability to use their discretion against
the public interest. Such an idea might seem absurdly radical until one
bears in mind the way in which our own early legal history was a story
of pluralistic and sometimes competing jurisdictions. 6 Indeed the very
unthinkability of such an idea could itself be the mark of successful
exploitation-just as, on Dawkins' account, we would be that much more
effective as vehicles for the interests of our genes if we did not even suspect
that morality may not be all that it appears to be!17 But here I approach
ideas that are, in their way, even more radical than those which Finnis
sets out in the concluding sections of his books, and which it would not
be appropriate to explore now. I must, in consequence, conclude my account with a final tribute to the stimulation that Finnis's work has given
to those of us who care about the problems with which he has been
concerned, even when we may not agree fully with him on his suggested
solutions to those problems.

36Cf., e.g., H.J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION (1983).
37Cf. A.J. NOCK, Social Power vs State Power,in OUR ENEMY, THE STATE (1973).
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